论文标题
通过竞争，在依次决策中优化理性个体的集体准确性
Optimising collective accuracy among rational individuals in sequential decision-making with competition
论文作者
论文摘要
理论上的结果是基于人群的智慧（例如condorcet陪审团定理）通过汇总决策或意见来表明准确性的提高，但是该定理的基础通常会在人们能够基于观察其他特工选择其他特定者之后适应自己选择的情况下通常会破坏自己的选择。在依次的决策中，理性代理人使用他人的选择作为有关正确决策的信息来源，从而在不同代理的选择之间建立了强大的相关性，这些选择违反了condorcet陪审团所取决于的独立性的假设。在本文中，我展示了当代理仅基于个人的精度奖励，以及该对集体准确性的影响时，这种相关性是如何出现的。然后，我演示了一个简单的竞争奖励方案，如果代理商正确选择已经选择的选项，则如何更大的奖励，可以诱导理性的代理人做出独立选择，从而使小组恢复最佳的集体准确性水平。我进一步表明，这种奖励计划是强大的，为各种竞争优势的集体准确性提供了改进，这表明可以在现实世界中有效实施此类方案，以改善集体智慧。
Theoretical results underpinning the Wisdom of Crowds, such as the Condorcet Jury Theorem, point to substantial accuracy gains through aggregation of decisions or opinions, but the foundations of this theorem are routinely undermined in circumstances where individuals are able to adapt their own choices based after observing what other agents have chosen. In sequential decision-making, rational agents use the choices of others as a source of information about the correct decision, creating powerful correlations between different agents' choices that violate the assumptions of independence on which the Condorcet Jury Theorem depends. In this paper I show how such correlations emerge when agents are rewarded solely based on their individual accuracy, and the impact of this on collective accuracy. I then demonstrate how a simple competitive reward scheme, where agents' rewards are greater if they correctly choose options that few have already chosen, can induce rational agents to make independent choices, returning the group to optimal levels of collective accuracy. I further show that this reward scheme is robust, offering improvements to collective accuracy across of wide range of competition strengths, suggesting that such schemes could be effectively implemented in real-world contexts to improve collective wisdom.
