论文标题
竞争均衡和双重拍卖
Competitive equilibrium and the double auction
论文作者
论文摘要
在本文中，我们重新审视了双重拍卖必然会产生竞争均衡的共同说法。首先，我们观察到竞争平衡具有一些违反直觉的含义：具体来说，它预测价值分配的单调转移可能会使价格不变。然后，使用实验，我们测试这些含义是否由数据证实。我们发现，在具有固定价值分布的双重拍卖中，最终的价格可能远非竞争均衡。我们还表明，当交易者可以随着时间的流逝而无需更换时，我们的反例的有效性就会钝化。综上所述，这些发现表明，“马歇尔路径”对于在双重拍卖中产生均衡价格至关重要。
In this paper, we revisit the common claim that double auctions necessarily generate competitive equilibria. We begin by observing that competitive equilibrium has some counterintuitive implications: specifically, it predicts that monotone shifts in the value distribution can leave prices unchanged. Using experiments, we then test whether these implications are borne out by the data. We find that in double auctions with stationary value distributions, the resulting prices can be far from competitive equilibria. We also show that the effectiveness of our counterexamples is blunted when traders can leave without replacement as time progresses. Taken together, these findings suggest that the `Marshallian path' is crucial for generating equilibrium prices in double auctions.
