论文标题
区块链交易费用分配的贝叶斯机制设计
Bayesian Mechanism Design for Blockchain Transaction Fee Allocation
论文作者
论文摘要
在区块链系统中，交易费用机制的设计对于矿工和用户的稳定性和满意度至关重要。最近的一项工作证明了不可能实现非零矿工收入和对用户统治与企业兼容（DSIC）的不可能的勾结机制。但是，积极的矿工收入对于激励矿工来说很重要。为了应对这一挑战，我们考虑了贝叶斯游戏设置，并放宽用户对贝叶斯 - 纳什 - 征收兼容性（BNIC）的DSIC要求。特别是，我们提出了一种辅助机制方法，该方法在BNIC和DSIC机制之间建立联系。使用辅助机制方法，我们根据多项式Logit（MNL）选择模型设计了一种交易费用机制（TFM），并证明TFM具有BNIC和串通式固定特性，具有渐近的恒定恒定因素近似于I.I.D的最佳矿机收入。有限的估值。我们的结果打破了零收入的障碍，同时保留了真实性和防勾结特性。
In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner revenue and Dominating-Strategy-Incentive-Compatible (DSIC) for users. However, a positive miner revenue is important in practice to motivate miners. To address this challenge, we consider a Bayesian game setting and relax the DSIC requirement for users to Bayesian-Nash-Incentive-Compatibility (BNIC). In particular, we propose an auxiliary mechanism method that makes connections between BNIC and DSIC mechanisms. With the auxiliary mechanism method, we design a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) based on the multinomial logit (MNL) choice model, and prove that the TFM has both BNIC and collusion-proof properties with an asymptotic constant-factor approximation of optimal miner revenue for i.i.d. bounded valuations. Our result breaks the zero-revenue barrier while preserving truthfulness and collusion-proof properties.
