论文标题
恒定的功能市场构成，社会福利和最大提取价值
Constant Function Market Making, Social Welfare and Maximal Extractable Value
论文作者
论文摘要
我们认为可以通过恒定功能做市商（CFMM）来促进的社会福利。当CFMM提供足够的流动性时，当所有用户交易执行时，它可以近似最佳的社交福利。当一种代理具有提出块的作用，而区块空间很少时，它们可以获得比其他相同的代理更高的预期效用。当块空间稀缺时，这给出了最大可提取值的下限。
We consider the social welfare that can be facilitated by a constant function market maker (CFMM). When there is sufficient liquidity available to the CFMM, it can approximate the optimal social welfare when all users transactions are executed. When one of the agent has the role of proposing the block, and blockspace is scarce, they can obtain higher expected utility than otherwise identical agents. This gives a lower bound on the maximal extractable value exposed when blockspace is scarce.
