论文标题
使用Edge Computing重新访问具有隐私的基于位置的服务协议
Revisiting a Privacy-Preserving Location-based Service Protocol using Edge Computing
论文作者
论文摘要
基于位置的服务日常变得越来越受欢迎。一些使用基于位置的服务的服务，发现附近的商店，基于接近的营销，公路服务援助等。在基于位置的服务中，必须保护用户身份，用户查询和位置之类的用户信息。 Ma等。 （Infocom-bigsecurity 2019）使用某种同型加密（SHA）提出了基于隐私的位置服务。他们的协议使用的边缘节点在她加密位置数据上计算的边缘节点，并确定基于位置的服务器（LBS）中包含的$ k $ neart最兴趣点，而无需向LBS揭示原始用户坐标，从而确保用户位置的隐私。在这项工作中，我们表明了Ma等人的上述协议。有关键缺陷。特别是，我们表明他们的安全比较协议具有正确的问题，因为它不会导致正确的比较。这个缺陷的主要结果是，解决此问题的直接方法将使他们的协议不安全。也就是说，LBS将能够恢复每个查询中用户的实际位置。
Location-based services are getting more popular day by day. Finding nearby stores, proximity-based marketing, on-road service assistance, etc., are some of the services that use location-based services. In location-based services, user information like user identity, user query, and location must be protected. Ma et al. (INFOCOM-BigSecurity 2019) proposed a privacy-preserving location-based service using Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE). Their protocol uses edge nodes that compute on SHE encrypted location data and determines the $k$-nearest points of interest contained in the Location-based Server (LBS) without revealing the original user coordinates to LBS, hence, ensuring privacy of users locations. In this work, we show that the above protocol by Ma et al. has a critical flaw. In particular, we show that their secure comparison protocol has a correctness issue in that it will not lead to correct comparison. A major consequence of this flaw is that straightforward approaches to fix this issue will make their protocol insecure. Namely, the LBS will be able to recover the actual locations of the users in each and every query.
