论文标题
动态联盟形成中稳定的原因
Causes of Stability in Dynamic Coalition Formation
论文作者
论文摘要
我们通过在红衣主教享乐游戏中的简单动态来研究稳定结果的形成，在该游戏中，代理商的实用程序会随着时间的推移而变化，具体取决于联盟形成过程的历史。具体而言，我们分析了联盟成员减少其效用的情况下的情况，或者增加其对加入代理的效用（赞赏）。我们表明，与经典动力学相反，对于怨恨或欣赏的代理人，保证在轻度条件下的各种稳定性概念会融合。因此，我们确定怨恨和欣赏是强大的稳定驱动力。
We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where members of a coalition decrease their utility for a leaving agent (resent) or increase their utility for a joining agent (appreciation). We show that in contrast to classical dynamics, for resentful or appreciative agents, dynamics are guaranteed to converge under mild conditions for various stability concepts. Thereby, we establish that both resent and appreciation are strong stability-driving forces.
